People more afraid of catching COVID-19 are more judgemental, study finds
New research by Robert Henderson and Dr Simone Schnall found that people more concerned about catching COVID-19 were more disapproving of the wrong-doings of others, whatever they were doing wrong.
The researchers say their findings are evidence that our morality is shaped by various emotions and intuitions, of which concerns about health and safety are prominent. This means that our judgements of wrongdoing are not completely rational.
The study, published today in the journal Evolutionary Psychology, did not focus on behaviours relating to the pandemic itself - such as social distancing - but considered a wide range of moral transgressions.
Between March and May 2020, over 900 study participants in the USA were presented with a series of scenarios and asked to rate them on a scale from 鈥榥ot at all wrong鈥 to 鈥榚xtremely wrong鈥. This enabled the researchers to measure participants鈥 responses across five key moral principles: harm, fairness, in-group loyalty, deference to authority, and purity.
Example scenarios include one of loyalty: 鈥榊ou see a man leaving his family business to go work for their main competitor鈥; and one of fairness: 鈥榊ou see a tenant bribing a landlord to be the first to get their apartment repainted.鈥
People who were more worried about catching COVID-19 judged the behaviours in these scenarios to be more wrong than those who were less worried.
Dr Schnall said: 鈥淭here is no rational reason to be more judgemental of others because you are worrying about getting sick during the pandemic. These influences on judgements happen outside of our conscious awareness. If we feel that our wellbeing is threatened by the coronavirus, we are also likely to feel more threatened by other people鈥檚 wrong-doing 鈥 it鈥檚 an emotional link.鈥
The findings contribute to a growing body of evidence of a link between physical disgust 鈥 an emotion designed to keep us from harm 鈥 and moral condemnation.
This research was funded by the Gates Foundation Cambridge and the Bennett Institute for Public Policy.
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